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1. 
The agricultural sector or New Zealand is organised, 
levied and controlled by a proliferation or Boards, 
Committees, Or~anisations and Authorities which all, 
in some way, owe their existence to central or local 
government. These bodies are not departments or 
sections or departments but take a variety or shapes 
and rorms. Such organisations exist in every sector 
or the economy and have become known as "quangos". 
It is proposed in this paper to consider the amount 
of Government intervention in the wool industry 
which is exerted through rour quangos, the New 
Zealand Wool Board, the Meat and Wool Boards' 
Economic Service, the New Zealand Wool Testing 
Authority and the Wool Research Organisation or 
New Zealand. 
I. AGRICULTURAL QUANGOS 
For the purposes or this paper 'quango' will denote 
"quasi non-government org;i nisations". 
1 Due to the 
wide variety or runctions and forms or organisations 
gathered under the label or a quango it is extemely 
difficult to arrive at a precise derinition or the 
term. A broad description or this class or body 
is; a non-departmental organisation which has a 
degree of autonomy to perrorm some function on 
behalf of the Government. 
In the agricultural field quangos include: 
( i) producer boards; for example, the New Zealand 
Wool Board, the New Zealand Dairy Board, the Wheat 
Board, the Poultry Board, the Potato Board, the 
r~ W UBPARY 
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Honey Marketing Authority, the Citrus Marketing 
Authority, the Tobacco Ooard, the Apple and Pear 
Marketing Authority c1nd the Hop Marketing Committee. 
(ii) committees established to advise the Government 1 
for example, the Tobacco Research Advisory Committee 
and the Noxious Plant Advisory Committee. 
(iii) boards and committees to deal with a specific 
problem,for example, the Agricultural Pests Destruction 
Council, and the Nassella Tussock Boards. 
(iv) authorities for monitoring and setting price 
levels1 for example, the Milk Prices Auth
ority and the 
Meat Export Prices Committee. 
A number of quangos, such as the New Zealand Dairy 
Board which holds a monopoly on the acquisition and 
marketing of dairy produce for export, have a very 
important role to play. Others have never me~ for 
example, the Co-operative Dairy Companies Income Tax 
. 2. 
Appeal Authority. 
Agricultural quangos vary as to the source of their 
powers. Many are covered by statute for example, the 
Dairy Board Act 1976, the Poultry Board Act 1980, the 
Wheat Board Act 1965 and the Pork Industry Act 1974 
which governs the New Zealand Pork Industry Council. 
For some no direct statutory or regulatory authority 
exists because they have been established by another 
quango, the New Zealand Meat and Wool Boards Economic 
Service was formed in this manner. 
The latter type of organisation illustrates what has 
been claimed to be the quan~o's most no~~bl e 
characteristic, that is, that "the quango never grows 
old, rcther it multiplies, or takes on new forms" .5 
In the agricultural sector of New Zealand a great deal 
of evidence can be found to support this statement. 
A quango's propensity to multiply may be viewed in 
Christopher Hood's terms as the system reproducing 
itself at the level of quasi-governmental bodies. 
We can then, "spin the wheel once more and add to 
Quangos 'quasi-non-quasi governmental' bodies - the ••• 
agencies of 'quasi-governmental' organisations."i 
It is suggested that it is into the category of 
quasi-non-quasi governmental organisations, hereafter 
referred to as "quasi-quango's", that the Meat and 
Wool Boards' Economic Service, falls. This organisation 
will be discussed in detail later in the paper.b 
It has been shown that quangos exist in the 
agricultural sector in many forms and fulfil a 
variety of functions. The reasons for establishing a 
quango in a particular form are diverse. 
b 
Some of' 
these reasons are: 
(i) swings in public administration fashions and 
moods over time, that is, a change in the opinion 
of how an agency is to be established rather than a 
change in the tasks faced by that a~ency. 
(ii) practicalities of the task which indicate the 
form that the agency is to take and so the agency 
is built up from its ta s ks. 
4 . 
(iii) political lo ~ic, for example, 
(a) to escape from an unsympathetic departmental 
enviroment, 
(b) to provide patronage, 
(c) as a means of 'cooking the books' about the real 
size of the state bureau~c,~~~ 1 
(d) a reorganisation to give a 'new Look' 
(e) to remove a politically sensitive area from 
Government control or apparent Government control. 
No single reason will explain why an organisation is 
established in one form rather than another. There 
are often competing factors which must be taken into 
account. In the agricultural sector for example, 
there may be a desire by farmers to remain independent 
of the Government but the task may be such that some 
form of Government intervention is necessary. The 
resulting agency would probably allow for some input 
from farmers as well as a degree of control by 
Government. 
The many reasons for creatin~ a quango form part of 
the current debate concerning the advantages and 
disadvantages of quangos. 
1 The problems associated 
with quangos are seen to be that they provide 
patronage, can be used to disguise the real size of 
the bureau~c~ ~c y and that they are difficult to 
make accountable to Ministers, Parliament and the 
Courts. The strengths of quangos, by comparison, 
have been contended to be, firstly that they provide 
a means of escaping the centralised departments, 
secondly that they can remove activities from direct 
5 • 
Government control or at least apparent Government 
control and thirdly that they provide a method of 
involving the public in the process of Government. 
For example, by allowing a group, such as farmers, 
to participate in an agency they are encouraged to 
participate in the fabric of Government but at the 
same time the level of control by and accountability 
to the Government is decreased. 
The wool industry within the agricultural sector of 
the economy has, over many years, rejected moves which 
it perceives as diminishing its independence from 
Government. There has been a high level of opposition 
to any suggestion of the introduction of a compulsory 
acquisition scheme for wool on a similar basis to that 
operated for dairy products by the New Zealand Dairy 
Board. The wool industry is however of great importan
ce 
to the New Zealand economy as a whole, for example the 
provisional value of gross wool production for 1979 
was $613 million, the highest value for any agricultural 
product,~ and exports of wool were for the year ended 
June 1979 worth $683 million. q In an industry which 
makes such a significant contribution to the country 
some degree of Government intervention is, it is submitted, 
inevitable. It is the purpose of this paper to inquire
 
into the nature of Government intervention in the 
wool industry through a consider~tion of four quangos 
within the industry. The level and mode of Government 
influence will be examined in relation to the New 
7,ealand Wool noard, the Meat and Wool Boards' 
Economic Service, the New Zealand Wool Testing Authority 
and the Wool Research Organisation of New Zealand (WRONZ). 
G. 
II THE NEW ZEJ\LAND \\TOOL ROARD 
A. Functions and Powers 
The Wool Board was established by the Wool Industry 
Act 1977 IO from an amalgamation of the New Zealand 
Wool Commission and the New Zealand Wool Marketing 
Corporation. Thus, the Wool Board provides an 
example of a quango that has taken on a new shape. 
The object of the Wool Roard is set out in very 
broad terms by section 16 of the Wool Industry 
Act 1977 to be "to obtain, in the interests of growers 
the best possible long-term returns for New Zealand 
wool". 
The functions and corresponding powers of the Wool 
Board are laid down by sections 17 and 18 respectively, 
of the Wool Industry Act 1977. These sections are set 
out fully in appendix i. The Wo o l Board is to be 
responsible for the promotion and marketing of New 
Zealand wool. I t also has the function of carrying 
out research into wool and sheep. In order to perform 
these functions the Wool Board is able to purchase, sell, 
or offer to sell wool and to negotiate and enter into 
agreements in respect of terms for the transportation 
of wool. Paragraphs (a) and (f) of section 18 ( 2 ) 
ensure the ~ool Board's ability to undertake r e search 
whether independently or in combination or association 
with the New Zealand Meat Producers Board and/or the 
New Zealand Dairy Board. The Wool Board's power to 
fulfil its object is specifically ensured by section 
18 ()) of the Wool Industry Act 1977. 
• • 
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Power is given under sections 22 and 23 to issue, 
refuse, revo~e and suspend licences to receive, 
store, or appraise any wool that has not previously 
been sold in New Zealand. Section 22 provides 
that licences are to be required "after such date as 
Board may by public notice appoint". Such a date has, 
. f t b · t d 11 1n ac , never een appo1n e • Due to such licences 
having never been issued, the Wool Industry Appeal 
Authority, as provided for under section 28 of the 
Wool Industry Act 1977, has not been established. The 
Appeal Authority was to have three members appointed by 
the Governor General on the recommendation of the 
Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries. The procedure 
to be followed on appeal is clearly laid down under 
sections 29 and 30 which also state that decisions of 
the Appeal Authority are to be final and binding • 
It does not appear likely though that licencin g 
provisions in the Wool Industry Act 1977 will ever 
be invoked a nd therefore, the Wool Industry Appeal 
Authority will probably never be created. Clearly 
the Appeal Authority is dependent upon the Wool 
noard's actions because without a 1icencing system 
being introduced by the Aoard there would be no 
reason for the Appeal Authority existing. The 
composition and powers of the Aut hority are not 
however determined by the Wool Roard but have been 
laid down, in the Wool Indu s try Act 1977, by Parliament. 
The Wool Industry Appeal Authority's powers stem 
directly from Government through statute and all the 
members of the Appeal Authority are nominees of the 
Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries. The introduction 
• • • • • • 
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of the Wool Industry Appeal Authority would, 
because of its relationship to Government, be 
the creation of a quango. It is reliant on the 
Board's action for its inception, but would function 
according to statute as a non-departmental body, the 
membership of which is determined by Government. 
B. Finance 
The Wool Board's funds are in two categories. The 
first type held in the Wool Board Levy Account, may 
only be used for promotion and research. This is 
provided for by section 59 of the Wool Industry Act 
1977 • The level of the levy paid by each grower into 
this account jg set down by regulation under the Wool 
Industry Regulations 1978, S.R. 1978/6, made pursuant 
to the Wool Industry Act 1977. The Wool Board Levy 
Account for the year ended 30 June 1980 had an excess 
of income over expenditure of $7,804,78~ 
13 
which was 
at the end of the financial year, transferred to the 
Promotion and Research Account. For the year ended 
30 June 1980 a Government grant of two million dollars 
was present in the Wool Board Levy Account, this 
represented New Zealand's approximate share of the 
International Wool Secretariat's 
1
~ expenditure on 
research and development. There hav e been no 
subseriuent Government grants and none are anticipated 
. h f' . 1 ,~ 1n t e present 1nanc1a year. 
The second category of Wool Board funds are those which, 
under section 59 (8) of the Wool Industry Act 1977, can 
o nly be spent on promotion and resenrch with the ~~nsent 
9. 
of the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
These general funds had an excess of income over 
expenditure for the year ended 30 June 1980 of 
$14,322,760. I" 
Part of the Wool Board's general income is generated 
by its wool trading activities. In order to maintain 
conridence in the market the Board will buy wool when 
market prices are low and hold this stock until prices 
increase again. For example, closing stock as at 30 
June 1980 was valued at $48,490,479 consisting of 
11 
19,456 tonnes of wool. For the year ended 10 June 1980 
the income to the Wool Board from the Wool Trading Account 
was $6,362,277. This represented thirty-one percent 
of their total income.
18 
The remaining general income is termed "non-tradin g incom e " 
and is derived from sale of investments, dividends, intere s t 
and rents. In the year ended 10 June 1980 these grossed 
$13,544,169 which combined with the trading income 
gave a total income of $ 19,906,446. After the payment 
of expenses the net profit was $14,322,760 lq to be 
transferred to Capital Funds. 
The Board under sections 31 to 40 of the Wool Industry 
Act 1977 administer s a Minimum Wo o l P rice Fundin g 
Scheme. This Scheme is financed by minimum price 
funding levies paid by the ~rower. These funds are 
maintained as a tot a lly separate account and had a 
balance of $17,075,565 as at 30 June 1980. 
10 The 
level of the minimum price funding levy is set by 
regulation and was dropped to 1 perrent by the Wool 
10. 
Industry Regulations 1980,S.R.1980/155 made pursuant 
to the Wool Industry Act 1977. The rate of the 
minimum price funding levy for the 1979 season was 
2 percent and a total of $16,489,116 was collected.
21 
Combined with interest the accumulated fund reached 
$69,539,748 by June, 1980. '12. Section 39 (2) (b) of 
the Wool Industry Act 1977 allows the Wool Board, with 
the approval of the Minister of Finance, to use money 
out of the Minimum Price Funding Account to administer 
Parts II and III of the Wool Industry Act 1977. These. 
include the Board's wool trading activities and as 
at 30 June 1980 the Wool Board's borrowing from the 
Minimum Price Funding Account for this purpose was 
'l '5 
$40,504,694. Payments are made to wo~ growers from 
this fund only if wool prices fall below a set minimum 
price. This had not occured in the 1979-1980 season 
and so no payments had been made. 
Provision is made in the Wool Industry Act 1977, under 
section 42, for the Wool Board to collect a grower 
retention levy. This is only collected when the 
national price for wool, as calculated by the Wool 
Board on behalf of the Minister of Agriculture and 
Fisheries under section 43, rises above the "trig~er 
price" set 
section 41. 
for the season by the Minister under 
During the 1979-1980 season the mark e t 
did not reach the trigger price and therefore no 
retention levies were collected. 'l,4-
The Wool Board also administers a Government supplementary 
minimum pricing scheme. The minimum price level set 
by the Government is above the Wool Board's floor price 
1 1 • 
level for its own minimum price funding scheme. The 
supplementary minimum pricing account is financed 
entirely by the New Zealand Government and in the 
year ended 30 June 1980 $27,641 was paid out of it 
~5 
to growers. 
C. Personnel 
The New Zealand Wool Board is constituted in accordance 
with section 4 (2) of the Wool Industry Act 1977. 
Nine directors are appointed by the Governor-General, 
of these six represent the wool growers, one is 
nominated by the Wool Ooard, and two are nominated by 
the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries. The tenth 
Board memeber is the Director-General of Agriculture and 
Fisheries. The tenure of appointments to the Wool 
Board is set by section 6 of the Wool Industry Act 1977, 
at three years, with an eligibility for reappointment 
from time to time. A director may be renominated 
by either the growers, the Minister or the Board, and 
not necessarily his original nominator. A director 
may not be removed by the Mi11ister even if he was 
originally nominated by the Minister. The only power 
of removal is that vested in the Governor-General on 
the grounds of disability, bankruptcy, neglect of duty 
. 11 
or misconduct. 
The appointment of all staff below the directors is the 
responsibility of the Board. Wool noard staff are not 
members of the Public Service Association but belong 
to private sector unions. 
• • • 
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D. Level of Government Involvement 
The Wool Board under section 17 (2) of the Wool 
Industry Act 1977 has a duty, as one of its functions 
to report to the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries 
from time to time in relation to all or any of the 
functions specified in the Wool Industry Act 1977. 
The Wool Board is bound by the Wool Industry Act 1977 
to submit its table of minimum prices for the Minimum 
Prices Scheme to the Minister of Agriculture and 
Fisheries for approval. In this regard the Minister 
is limited to an acceptance or a refusal of the proposed 
table. Guidelines for the compilation of this table 
by the Board are laid down in the statute along with 
suggested limits, outside of which approval should be 
given "in circumstances that are in the Minister's 
. . t . 1 " 2 q Th . . t t 1 opinion excep iona • e Minis er canno compe 
the Board to adopt any particular table of prices as 
the choice is always left with the Board to retain the 
status quo. 
A slightly wider power is given to the Minister 
concerning the trig~er prices for the individual 
growers income retention scheme. ~O This price is 
set by the Minister after consult~tion with the Board. 
Thus the final decision is that of the Minister but 
unlike the minimum price table considered above, the 
Wool Board must accept his decision. In practice, 
at present, the Wool Board plays an important role 
in determining the trigger price, with the Minister 
seeking the recommendation and agreement of the Board 
t d t 
. . 31 
o any propose rigger prices. 
1 3 . 
The introduction of the Government's supplementary 
minimum scheme has meant that the table of minimum 
prices of the Wool Board's scheme funded by the 
growers has lost much of its importance. This is 
because the intervention price for the Government 
scheme is above that of the Wool Board scheme. 
Influence over the market is therefore achieved by 
the Government using Treasury r e sources administered 
by the Wool Board. If the Government supplementary 
scheme w~s to be removed the Wool Board's scheme would 
become the only means of maintaining growers incomes. 
This would increase the importance of both the table of 
minimum prices and the retention levy trigger prices 
and therefore may cause the Minister to make his 
decisions with less consultation with the Board.
31 
In the Wool Board's present financial position the 
need for the Minister of Finance's consent for an 
overdraft on the Minimum Wool Prices Funding Account 
under s.,8 of the Wool Industry Act 1977 is not 
important. ~ 3 This is a power which could be used to 
financially restrain the Wool Board in their provision 
of income support scheme s , if the financial position 
changed in the future. 
The consent of the Min i ster of Finance is at present 
important for the use of funds from the Minimum Wool 
Prices Funding Account for the purchase of wool.
3 ~ 
The Wool Board is financially independent from the 
Government in the sense that it does not receive any 
money from a departmental vote or a grant. The Wool 
Board, does however receive under section 58 of the 
1 4 • 
Wool Industry Act 1977, a tax exemption. The 
actual value of this exemption is difficult to 
determine from the New Zealand Wool Roard Annual 
Report and Statements of Accounts July 1 1979 to 
June 30 1980, as profit assessable for tax would be 
calculated on a different accounting basis to the net 
profit for the year of $14,322,760 shown in the profit 
and loss account. 35 However the trading account does 
give some indication in the fact that a profit of 
$6,362,277 '3(, is given and if this were all assessable 
for tax, at the present company tax rate of 45 cents in 
the dollar ~, the income tax on the trading prof'i t alone 
would be approximately $2,86),024. If' this trading 
had been carried out by a registered company that tax 
would have had to have been paid to the Government. 
By deliberate Government policy, included in the Wool 
Industry Act 1977, the Wool Board does not have to pay 
any tax. 
Thus the Government does have a role in the financing 
of the Wool Board because if the Board did have to pay 
tax, no matter what the actual amount of that tax, the 
profit paid as tax would not be available to pursue the 
noard's objective of obtaining the best possible long-
term returns for New Zealand wool, in the interests of 
the growers. To maintain the Wool Board's funding at 
its existing level the tax payments would have to be 
met by an increase in grower levies. This means that 
the tax exemption to the Wool Board is of direct benefit 
to the growers and therefore, it is submitted, it can 
be viewed as a Government subsidy to the wool growers. 
If this subsidy were given as a Government Grunt to the 
1 5 • 
Wool Board the Board would be b~ught within the 
purview 01 the Public Expenditure Committee. A 
tax'exemption is however an indirect payment which 
does not cause the Wool Board to be scrutinised by 
the Public Expenditure Committee. 
Not only does the Wool Board appear to be the vehicle 
1or a Government subsidy to growers by the removal 01 
a cost that the growers would otherwise have had to 
bear but, it is also used as a means 01 carrying out 
Government policy through the supplementary minimum 
pricing scheme. The Wool Board in this instance is 
used to administer a scheme which it has absolutely 
no control over. When the Wool Board is performing 
this £unction it has no ability to decide when payments 
are to be made or how much they are to be. The financial 
resources used are not however, those of the Wool Board 
and so the Government~ control over the supplementary 
minimum pricing scheme does not ~ive it control over 
Wool Board funds. 
One possible avenue for Ministerial control over Board 
activities that are funded 1rorn Board resources is 
through the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries's 
power to nominate two directors to the Board. In the 
past these members have not been nominated for their 
political affiliations but solely for their commercial 
39 
experience, as required under the Act. These positions 
do however have the potential for use as a mean s 01 
manipulating the Board. It is submitted that, while 
the Minister's nominees have not been overtly political, 
it is unlikely that they would have held views directly 
• 
• ll 
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opposed to those that the Minister wished to see 
implemented. 
The other directorship which presents the Minister of 
Agriculture and Fisheries with means of influencing 
the Wool Board is the ex officio position of the 
Director General of Agriculture and Fisheries. He 
was not considered to be a direct agent of the Minister 
although it was recognised that he communicated Govern-
ment policy to the Board. 3 9 The extent to which the 
Director-General could in fact play the role of the 
Minister's mouth-piece is immense. 
head of the Minister's department 
As the permanent 
the Director-General 
is constitutionally the Minister's servant. However, 
there are many interesting variables in this relationship 
which mean that it is also possible for the Director-
General to act independently from his Minister. For 
example, the issue being decided, the political circum-
stances at the time, the knowledge of the files and access 
to information of each party and the relative abilitie s 
01 the Minister and the Director-G e neral.~
0 Thus at 
present, it appears that the Minister's powers to 
influence the Board are latent. However the fact that 
the Minister does not overtly exercise control does not 
necessarily mean that he does not have any influence on 
the decisions of the Wool Board. Th e close relationship 
between the Minister and the Director-General for example 
may well provide an informa l line of communication. 
The importance of these informal connections has recently 
41 
been expressed by Murdoch Taylor, 
• • • ---
I ~ 
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Formal intervention by a minister 
in the activities of a non-departmental 
organisation is rare yet this apparent 
abstention can be offset by the maintenance 
of numerous informal links between ministers, 
departments, and boards. 
It is possible that informal links between the Minister 
and the Wool Board are just as influential on decisions 
taken by the Board as formal correspondence would be • 
While informal channels must be taken into account the 
formal avenues for Ministerial control would be greatly 
increased if Part V of the Wool Industry Act 1977 was 
ever introduced. J+, l This part of the Act may only be 
brGught into force upon request of the Board and if 
"60 percent or more of the valid votes" in a referendum 
of all growers, owning 100 or more sheep are 
J+.3 
in favour. 
Upon its introduction Part V would allow the Woo l 
Board to purchase and market all wool that is offered 
for sale. Current opjnion among wool growers is 
strongly opposed to the introduction of Part V and 
this may be attributed in part to a fear of increased 
Government control of the industry.~~ The Board could 
need Treasury financial support to purchase the wool 
and the Minister of Finance's control over the overdr~ ft 
facilities would probably have incr e ased importance. The 
Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries would have power 
to influence the wool~rowers' incomes as section 52(3) 
of the Wool Industry Act 1977 provides that not mor e 
than half of the Wool Boards profit in any one year 
may be distributed to growers without the Minister's 
consent. 
Ill 
I _) 
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Th0 Wool noard is a non-departmental body established 
by statute or, in short, a quango. It is neither 
entirely controlled by the Government nor is it 
autonomous. The Wool Board views itself as a growers 
organisation which is independent of Government for 
its finance. But, the tax exemption may be seen to 
provide a subsidy to the Wool Roard funds, and the 
Minister of Finance's approval is necessary before 
overdraft and borrowing facilities can be used. In its 
administration of the Government's supplementary 
minimum pricing scheme the Wool Hoard is in fact simply 
a vehicle for Government policy, although the Board does 
have more autonomy when administering its own funds. It 
is however, a level of autonomy that is restricted by the 
statutory powers of the Minister of Agriculture and 
Fisherie s to determine the minimum prices table and the 
trig g er price, by two M~nisterial nominee s to the Board 
and possibly, also hy in£ ormal links between the Minister, 
the Department of Agriculture and Fish e rie s , and the 
Board. 
--
• ------
j q . 
III THE NEW ZEALAND MEAT AND WOOL 130ARDS' ECONOMIC SERVICE 
A. Functions 
The Meat and Wool Boards' Economic Service was 
established in 1950 following a Royal Commission 
to inquire into and report upon the sheep farming 
industry in New Zealand. A need was found to exist 
for more specific information on sheep farm production 
and financial returns.~
5 
The Economic Service is an advisory body which was 
founded by the Wool Board and the Meat Producers 
Board and is not regulated by statute. The function 
of the Economic Service is" to study the economics 
of the pastoral industry and to provide the Boards 
with a sound statistical basis for policy decisions". 4-fo 
Control over the Economic Service is exercised by a 
joint committee of repr e sentatives from each Board. 
R. Finance 
Finance for thr Economic Service is provided on an 
equal basis by the Meat Producers Board and the Wool 
Board. The power to do so by the Wool Board is given 
by sections 17 (1) (j) and 18 (2) (f) as quoted above, 
of the Wool Industry Act 1977. The budget is agreed 
upon by the joint governing committee. 
The Government does not dictate to the Boards the 
amount they should allocate to the Economic Service. 
In the year ended 30 June 1980 each noard contributed 
$205,000 with the combined contributions amounting to 
ninety-seven percent of the income of the Economic 
r . 41 ;:,erv1ce. Financial control is firmly held by the 
m 
m 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-• 
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two ~oards as they provide the vast majority of the 
funding. The remaining three percent of income in 
the year ended 30 June 1980 came from interest and 
gain on the sale of fixed assetsf~ Being founded to 
undertake research into the problems of the sheep 
industry and to provide data concerning the economics 
of the Boards, there is no provision for the Service 
to generate its own income. 
C. Personnel 
The members of the joint committee are appointed by 
the two Hoards. The joint committee is then responsible 
for appointing the Economic Service staff. Staff 
members of the Economic Service do not belong to 
public sector unions. 
D. Level of Government Involvement 
The Economic Service is answerable only to the Meat 
Producers Board and thP Wool Board, there is no 
direct responsibility to any Minister of the Crown. 
The only possible line of control for the Minister 
of Agriculture and Fisheries is indirectly through 
his appointees to the Boards. The relationship 
between the Minister and the Wool Board appointees, 
as discussed above, would indicate that by past 
experience any control of the Economic Service 
through this channel is unlikely. The members of 
the ~eat and Wool noards' ~conomic Service reflect 
the lack of Government intervention in their attitude 
that they are an advisory agency for the ~rowers and 
~q 
controlled by the ~rowers, and not a Government agency. 
--
DI 
DI 
DI 
DI 
2 1. 
The lack of any direct connection with Government 
means that the Meat and Wool Boards' Bconomic 
Service cannot be viewed in the same terms as the 
New Zealand Wool Board. Unlike the Wool Board the 
Economic Service does not have its composition laid 
down by statute and there is no Government input to 
financing or staffing. The Economic Service is 
performing its function for, and is directly 
responsible to, the Meat Producers Ooard and the 
Wool Board. Thus control of the Economic Service 
is independent of Government and therefore the 
Economic Service does not fit comfortably into the 
definition of a quango. It is submitted that as 
this organisation is carrying out its activities, 
not, on behalf of Government but, under the direction 
so 
and control of two quan~os it should be in a different 
category from a quango such as the Wool Aoard. The 
Economic Service as it is a spin-off from two quangos, 
fits within the definition of a quasi-quan~o. The 
Economic Service displays a distinctive feature of 
this type of quango in its lack of direct governmental 
control. 
---------
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IV THE NEW ZEALAND WOOL TESTING AUTHORITY 
A. Functions and Powers 
The Wool Testing Authority was established in 1965 
196 , .• 5' under the Wool Testing Authority Act ~ 
The functions of the Authority are set out in 
section 10 of the Wool Testing Authority Act 1964. 
They are; to carry out, on request, tests of wool 
and wool products in order to determine their 
characteristics, to issue a certificate accordingly, 
and to carry out experiments in order to improve the 
method of testing. 
Section 12 of the Wool Testing Authority Act 1964 
under subsection 13 gives the Authority all such 
"powers, rights, and privileges as may be reAsonably 
necessary or expedient to enable it to carry out its 
functions, and, in particular, without limiting the 
generality of the powers of the Authority it may from 
time to time" provide, develop or construct plant or 
machinery; acquire, lease, hold, dispose of land, 
buildings etc, appoint agents and advertise services. 
B. Finance 
It was clearly intended by the Legisature that the 
Wool Testing Authority was to provide its services 
on a user-pays basis. This was expressed in the 
Wool Testing Authority Act 1964 section 12 subsections 
(2) and (3) which state that the Authority may charge 
such fees for its services as it from time to time 
-----------
--
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determines and that it shall ensure that these fees 
are sufficient to meet its financial obligations. 
There has, over the last three to four years, been 
a rapid upturn in the demand for wool testing which 
has led to increased revenue. In the year ended 
30 June 1980 testing fees were increased by 6.7 
per cent while the Authority's gross revenue increased 
by 63,76 per cent to $1,323,787 which resulted in a 
net surplus of $187,613. 51 The Wool Testing 
Authority budgets on the basis of covering its 
expediture rather than to make a profit. 
Following the Wool Testing Authority Amendment Act 
1980 5~ the Authority may now borrow money as it 
thinks fit, and provide housing assjstance to its 
employees without seeking the aprroval of the 
Minister of Finance. 
c. PersonT'\el 
The members of the Wool Testing Authority, under 
section 1 (2) of the Wool Testing Authority Act 
1964 as amended by section 2 (1) of the Wool Testing 
Authority Amendment Act 1973 ~~ are appointed b y 
the Governor General in the following manner. 
Section 3 (2) (a) one member shal] be appointed Chairman 
on the recommendation of the Minister [of 
Agriculture and Fisheries] . 
(b) three member shall be appointed on the 
recommendation of the Minister [of Agriculture 
and Fi sheri e &J . 
-m 
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(c) three members shall be nominated 
by the Wool Hoard. 
Under section 8 (1) of the Wool Testing Authority 
Act 1964 as amended by section 3 (1) of the Wool 
Testing Authority Amendment Act 1980 the Deputy 
Chairman is appointed by the Authority. Prior to 
the 1980 amendment the power of appointing the 
Deputy Chairman was vested in the Minister of 
Agriculture and Fisheries. 
The Authority, by section 14 (1) of the Wool Testing 
Authority Act 1964 is given the power to appoint 
such officers as it considers necessary for the 
ef'ficient performance of its functions and the 
exercise of its powers. The employees so appointed 
are not members of public sector unions. 
D. Level of Government Involvement 
Whilst the Wool Testing Authority is perceived a s 
55" 
being autonomous its independence is still far from 
that of a private]y owned commercial enterprise. The 
Wool Testing Authority is performing a function on 
behalf of Government. It was established as a 
separate organisation in 1964 to carry out testing 
previously dealt with by the Department of Agriculture 
and Fisheries • It is a quango which has its composition, 
function and powers defined by statute • 
The actual testing techniques used are outside the 
provisions of the Act or the control of Government 
as they are dictated by the International Wool 
Textiles Organisation. 
• --
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The size and scope 01 the Wool Testing Authority's 
activities are also beyond direct Government control 
as the demand by wool buyers and growers for the 
Authority's services is the influenti~~ factor. It 
is then up to the Authority to provide the facilities 
to meet that demanct. 6 b 
The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries has no 
power under the Wool Testing Authority Act 1964 to 
issue directives to the Authority. In fact the 
Government has illustrated its willingness for the 
Wool Testing Authority to be largely,free 01 Government 
control through the removal of restraints ~
7 by the 
Wool Testing Authority Amendment Act 1980. 
time of the second reading 01 the Bill the 
At the 
Rt Hon. Mr. D. MacIntyre Minister of Agriculture and 
S"8 
Fisheries said of the Bill: 
it is interesting in that it removes 
powers from the Minister and gives 
them to an organisation to enable it 
to do its own thing •.• The Rill 
follows the Government's general 
policy of tryin~ to 1ree up 
organisations that come under th e 
general heading of 'private enterprise' 
This conscious move to ~ive the Authority "more 
s-q 
operating independence and flexibility" was a 
result of the strengthening of the Authority's 
1inancial position with the increase in demand 
for testing over recent years. 
--------------
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There is provision in the Wool Testing Authority Act 
1964 under section 16 for the Minister of Finance to 
advance money to the Authority, however the Authority 
does not receive any form of Government grant or any 
funds from a department vote. This means that although 
the Authority is audited by the Government Audit Office 
it is not subject to scrutiny by the Public Expenditure 
Committee. 
The financial structure of the Wool Testing Authority 
is 
and powers. 
influenced however by its statutory function s 
Unlike a commercial company the Authority 
has no shareholders to produce dividends for and the 
profit motive is replaced hy statute with a power to 
fix charges to cover costs. The Wool Testing Authority 
is not a profit making organisation but an organisation 
to provide a service for wool growers and buyers at 
cost. To this end the Wool Testing Authority by 
section 24 of the Wool Testing Authority Act 1964 is 
exempt from paying tax. That this exemption would be 
of assistance to the wool industry as a whole was 
explicitly recognised by the Rt. Hon. Sir 
Arthur M.P. in the Bill's second readin g, 
Basil 
f, 0 The 
tax exemption is not viewed by the Authority as being 
of any great importance or financial assistance to their 
operations. bi This is becaus e of the very small 
amount of their earnings which would in fact be 
assessable for income tax purposes. Jn 1977 and 1978 
the Authority had deficiencies in their profit and loss 
accounts 1979 a surplus of $50,640 was recorded 
and in 1980 a surplus of $187,61, was achieved. bJ 
-
la 
la 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
27. 
However it is almost certain that in the year ended 
30 June 1981 the Wool Testing Authority will have a 
deficit in its accounts. b~ It is probable that less 
than half of the surplus amounts of the years 1979 
and 1980 would actually be assessable for tax while 
for three of the last five years deficits have been 
recorded. Thus, even if the Wool Testing Authority 
had been paying income tax it would have made very 
little difference to the organisatiorls fin~ncial 
position. 
What is important is that the Wool Testing Authority 
does not have to make a profit, this means that the 
payment or non-payment of tax is insignificant as 
the Authority fixes its charges to cover expenditure 
alone. These changes do not take into account the 
need to make a profit or to pay tax, which are 
requirements for the vast majority of private 
commercial companies. The Government is therefore, 
through the Wool Testing Authority providing a 
subsidy to wool growers and buyers because the same 
services that are provided by the Authority would 
from a private company with a profit objective, b e 
more expensive for the user. 
The removal of the need to obtain the Minister of 
Finance's approval for borro~ing has meant that the 
only requirement to present a set of the accounts to 
the Government is under section 22 of the Wool Test-
ing Authority Act 1964. Pursuant to this section the 
Authority presents an annual report and statement of 
accounts to the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
• • • 
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There is no Government control over the level 
of staffing or the appointment of laboratory and 
clerical staff. The influence of the Government 
and the New Zealand Wool Board can be seen at the 
level of the appointments to the Wool Testing 
Authority Act 1964 as amended by section 2 (1) of 
the Wool Testing Authority Amendment Act 1980 • In 
practice the Minister does not use these positions 
for political purposes nnd once appointed the members 
do not consider themselves as under ministerial control • 
The Minister's power of recommending the Chairman is 
qualified by a requirement to consult the Wool Roard. 
These powers of appointment could be used by the 
Minister to exert control over the Wool Testing 
Authority for example, there is no statutory barrier 
to these appointments being made on the basis of 
political party affiliation s . 
The Minister does not have the power to nominate the 
total membership of' the Wool Testing Authority. Jlis 
power is matched by that of the Wool Aoard. The Wool 
Board, as described previously 
which the Minister could exercise 
is a quango over 
control, through 
his statutory right to appoint two members to the 
Board. Thus the nominations made by the Wo o l 
Board to the Wool Testing Authority could be subject 
to Ministerial influence, although at present this 
does not appear to happen. The Wool Testing 
Authoritv members currently represent the various 
facets of the wool industry for example the buyers, 
scourers and brokers as well as other quangos in the 
• -------------• -
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industry. The Chairman recommended by the Minister 
or Agriculture and Fisheries is a member or the Wool 
Board and Or. A. R. Edmunds is a principal scientist 
at the Wool Research Organisation or New Zealand. The 
balanced composition or the membership 01 the Wool 
Testing Authority illustrates that at present the 
parties concerned do consult over the nominations • 
The members nominated by the Minister are not under 
his formal control but they do provide a channel for 
an informal link with the Authority. This link 
could be used to influence the Authority in a similar 
manner to that discussed in relation to the Ministerial 
nominees to the Wool Board. 
The level of autonomy of the Wool Testing Authority 
is a direct result of Government policy. The 
Government has created in the Wool Testing Authority 
a quango to provide a facility ror the wool industry 
on a non-pro1it making basis. This function, laid 
down by statute, is fulfilled by the Authority with 
minimal Government involvement in its financing and 
decision making process. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • --• 
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V THE WOOL RESEARCH ORGANISATION OF NEW ZEALAND (INCJ 
A. Organisation and Functions 
The Wool Research organisation of New Zealand (WRONZ) 
was established in 1961 as a joint venture between 
the Government and the Wool Board, "Research Associa-
tions were part of the Department of Science and 
Industrial Research's policy and their efficiency had 
been demonstrated already in the Dairy Research 
Institute and the Meat Research Institute" bS"' which 
were also joint Producer Board/Government bodies • 
WRONZ was not established under its pwn specific 
statute but, as an incorporated society it is covered 
by the Incorporated Societies Act 1908. Accordingly 
bb 
it has its own set of rules which may he 
added to, altered or rescinded by 
resolution at a meeting of the 
Executive of which at least thirty 
days notice has been given stating 
the intention to propose such 
resolution and confirmation at 
another meeting of the Executive 
held not less than sixty days 
after the first meetin~ • 
It is these rules which contain the objects of WRONZ. 
They are, generally to promote and conduct research 
and other scientific work with or relating to wool. 
See appendix ii for a comprehensive list of the 
organisation's ohjects. 
• • • • 
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Membership of WRONZ is covered by Rule 4, and is 
divided into three categories, ordinary, industrial 
and associate • Ordinary members being-
(i) Persons who for the time being are 
members of the New Zealand Wool 
Board 
(ii) Persons who for the time being 
hold office as members of the 
Executive • 
Industrial members are persons or corporations 
engaged in-
( i ) 
(ii~ 
The wool textile 
industry 
manufacturing 
The wool scouring industry 
(iii) Any industry or trade relatin~ 
to the processin~, utilisation 
or marketing of wool or wool 
products. 
Associate members are persons elected by the Executive . 
The rules also provide for an Annual General Meeting 
and Special General Meetings decisions at which are 
by a majority of the members present • 
• • • • 
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B. Finance 
WRONZ is financed by a Wool Board research grant, 
subscriptions of industrial members, Government 
subsidy and sundry income from consultancy, 
publications and sundry sales • 
In the current year WRONZ estimates its income to be 
derived from: 61 
Wool Board 
Industry 
Government 
Sundry 
12% 
4 Q I / 0 
The average in the previous 1 years was: 
Wool Board 
Industry 
Government 
Sundry 
The recent increase in the Wool Board's financial 
support arises largely from the commitment of the 
International Wool Secretariat bS to the implementa-
tion and exploitation of technology, and its increasing 
rel,c..11ce on the input of technology from laboratories 
such as WRONZ, rather than itself being able to 
maintain an aggressive research and development 
programme specially related to New Zealand wool types. 
This increase in the Wool Board grant has not been 
met by a commensurate increase in the Government's 
contribution. The Government subsidy is received 
by quarterly instalments from the Department of 
Scientific and Industrial Research vote. The level 
• -
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of Government subsidy is dependent upon the net 
subsidisable expenditure of WRONZ, as this 
determines its classification group as a 
Research Association • 
The powers of the Executive as set out in appendix iii 
are wide enough to allow them to use the finance of 
the Organisation as appears to them to be necessary 
and proper. 
C. Personnel 
The composition of the Executive is, as under Rule 8 
(b) (1) 
The Executive shall consist of: 
( i ) Not less than four and not more 
than six persons appointed by 
the Wool Board. 
(ii) Two persons appointed by the 
Minister bein~ the Minister 
charged with the administration 
of the Scientific and Industrial 
Research Act 1952. 
(iii)One person appointed by the 
Minister of Agriculture. 
(iv) The Director-General of the 
Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research ex officio, 
or his nominee. 
fAW LIBRARY 
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(v) One person appointed by the 
Executive for his knowledge 
of the wool textile manufacturing 
industry, after consultation with 
the Industrial Members concerned. 
(vi) One person elected by Industrial 
Members engaged in the wool 
scouring industry. 
(vii)Such persons, not at any time 
exceeding three in number, as 
the Executive may from time to 
time appoint as co-opted members, 
without power to vote • 
Executive members appointed under Hule 8 (b) (i), 
(ii) and (iii) hold office until the expiry of the 
term specified in their appointments, while thos e 
under Rule 8 (b) (iv) and (vii) are members until 
the expiry of two years from the date when their 
appointment was made or last renewed by the Executive • 
The responsibility for all professional and administ-
ration staff is, under Rule 9 (vi), that of the 
Executive. S taff levels ar e set by the Executive 
and within this appointments are made by the Director, 
two Principal Scientists and the Secretary. Professional 
positions are subject to the approval of the Executive. 
WRONZ staff are not members of the State Services 
Association and job specifications and classifications 
are not necessarily in line with those in the State 
Service. However "WHONZ does use the State Service 
• • • ---
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pay rates as a guideline and endeavours to match them."{,, 
D. Level of Government Involvement 
Financially WRONZ is dependent upon its Government 
subsidy, as evidenced by this excerpt from the 
Chairman of the Executive's introduction to the 
WRONZ Annual Report 1979 -80 
io 
High inflation and national salary 
movements have put the Organisation's 
finances under severe pressure, and 
although subsidy income has increased 
with larger members' contributions, 
the stress has been compounded by 
Government's deci s ion to again hold 
levels of subsidy limit. A new 
Government funding formula ... will 
compensate for 70% of future annu a l 
inflation. lts henefit to WRO~ Z 
however in this financial ye a r i s 
minimal. 
WRONZ in the current year is mruginally more reliant 
on Wool Board support than on its Government subsidy. 
It is a reality of their standing as a research 
organisation that a proposed research pro gramm P 
must take into account the availability of finance 
but those providing the finance do not dictate the 
type of research undertaken. Initially a research 
programme will be developed after consultation with 
the Wool Board and industry groups. A cost analysis 
forms the basis for an application to the Wool Board 
• • • • --
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for a grant • The extent of, the Wool Board grant, 
industry subscriptions, general income and the 
assessed Government subsidy are all taken into 
account in the resulting budget. "The full 
research programme and financial budget are 
reviewed in detail by ~he WRONZ]Executive and 
senior management of the International Wool 
Secretariat." rl 
Government financial assistance is essential for the 
maintanence of the WRONZ research programme but this 
does not mean that the Government dictates how this 
money is to be spent . 
All of WRONZ's funding sources are seen to he 
"meticulous in recognising that the professional 
independence of our staff mu s t be preserved. The y 
are committed to maintaining effort in fundament a l 
research even where there is not a foreseeable 
commercial pay-off." ll. Each of the fundin g sources 
do play some role in determining the programme to 
be undertaken as the Wool Board, the technical 
sections of the International Wool Secretariat, 
industry and to a lesser extent the Department of 
Scientific and Industrial Research and Agriculture 
and Fisheries are consulted. 
The principal avenue for the Government to monitor 
the activities of WRON Z is through the Government 
appointees on the Executive. These include the 
two members appointed by the Minister for the 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research 
and the one appointed by the Minister of Agriculture. 
• • • -• ----• • • • • • • • • • • 
Direct responsibility to the Government may also 
be established through the ex officio member nominated 
by the Director-General of the Department of Scientific 
and Industrial Research. While this block of members 
may be able to influence the Executive and of course 
watch over the research projects pursued by WRONZ 
they are incapable, by voting strength alone of 
controlling the Executive. 
A more substantial role may be seen for the Wool Board 
members of the Executive who are capable of filling 
half the seats on the Executive. The predominance 
of the Wool Board is also apparent in the large degree 
of consultation between WRONZ and the Wool Board • 
WRONZ views itself as an independent body which is 
not under the control of, the Government, the Wool 
R d . d t 73 oar , or in us ry • While this may be true regarding 
the choice of research projects and the way in which 
they are pursued, WRONZ cannot be seen as totally 
independent of its sources of fundin~ especially the 
Government and th e Wool noard. Either the Government 
or the Wool noard, by cutting off funding to WRONZ 
could seriously curtail or even cause the total 
abandonment of WRO 'Z . It is only once this income is 
provided that th e Executive made up from all the 
interested parties, has the "sole control in regard 
to the management of the affairs of the organisation.'' 
74 
The Wool Board, a quango, can be seen to have a large 
input into every aspect of WRONZ but, unlike the Meat 
-
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and Wool Boards' Economic Service, WRONZ is not a 
spin-off from the Wool Ooard. Neither is it as 
closely related to Government as a department 
because although it is financed from the Department 
of Scientific and Industrial Research's vote WRONZ 
is a separate incorporated society. 
WRONZ is a quango over which the Government could 
exert a large degree of control. The most 
significant area of Government involvement is the 
substantial financial assist a nce without which 
WRONZ would be unable to function At its present 
level of activity. The removal of the Government 
subsidy would mean either the abandonment of some 
research projects or an increase in funding from the 
other sources. The Government is therefore, through 
WRONZ subsidising research and development in the 
wool industry • 
-
-
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VJ CONCLUSIONS 
Quangos play a major role in all spheres of agriculture. 
This paper has concentrated on just four of these 
Quangos that are an integral part of the wool industry. 
A desire on the part of wool growers to be independent 
from Government is recognised by Part V of the Wool 
Industry Act 1977 which leaves the decision regarding 
the introduction of compulsory acquisition with the 
wool growers. But it is evident from the nature of 
the quangos considered in this paper that they 
inextricably link the Government and the wool industry. 
The Wool Board which aims at obt ~ ining, in the interests 
of growers, the best possible long term returns for 
wool is open to formal and informal ministerial control 
over its decision-making body. The Wool Board also 
receives a tax exemption which may be viewed as 
equivalent to a financial subsidy from the Government. 
The Board also directly carries out Government policy 
through its administration of the supplementary 
Minimum Pricing Scheme, 
Ry comparison the Wool Board's spin-off organisation, 
the Meat and Wool Boards' Economic Service is under 
the direct control of the producer boards. This 
quasi-quango is however, open to indirect Government 
intervention through its parent quangos. 
-• 
-
-
-
Ill 
-
-
ID 
ID 
ID 
• • • • • • • • • 
40. 
The New Zealand Wool Testing Authority was established 
by Government to assist the wool industry and ministerial 
intluence may be exerted through ministerial nominees. 
Its financial transactions are tree from the need tor 
Government approval but the levels of testing charges 
retlect Government policy that the Authority ' s aim is 
to provide a service for the wool industry and not, to 
make a profit. 
The Wool Research Organisation of New Zealand by 
contrast not only has ministerial nominees on its 
Executive but it is also dependent on direct Governme nt 
financial assistance to maintain its research programme. 
Thus the Government is heavily involved in the bodies 
which organise, research, and service the wool industry~ 
The involvement takes many forms includin g , formal 
requirements for consultation and informal link s 
between the Minister, the Department and th e 
organisation • 
Government involvement in the area of finance is also 
mixed, taking the form of direct payments, and tax 
exemptions. None or the organisations considered in 
this paper are totally free from Government intervention 
instead, all are illustrative of the important role 01 
Government in the wool industry • 
• • • • • 
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~ppendix i 
Wool Industry Act 1977. 
Section 17 Functions of Board 
(1) The functions of the Board shall be-
(a) To promote the use of New Zealand 
wool in existing or new markets by 
such means as commend themselves to 
the Board: 
(b) To develop and maintain a marketing 
system for New Zealand wool suit e d 
to the requirements of the world's 
textile industry: 
(c) To market New Zealand wool, whether 
owned by the Board or by any other 
person , to the best possible advantage 
in competition with other textil e fibre s : 
(d) To bring about the greatest possibl e 
efficiencies in the preparation, 
handling, distribution, shipping, 
and selling of New Zealand wool 
consistent with its other function s : 
(e) To develop existing and new markets 
for New Zealand wool within and 
outside New Zealand: 
(f) To provide information on market 
re~uirements as a guide to the planning 
of wool production and the preparation 
( 2 ) 
()) 
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(g) To encourage the production in 
New Zealand of types of wool 
suited to market requirements: 
(h) To administer the schemes established 
under this Act: 
(i) To undertake and cause to be 
undertaken, research into wool 
and sheep: 
(j) To maintain information on wool 
production costs and the economic 
state of the New Zealand wool 
industry: 
(k) Such other functions as may be 
conferred on it by this Act or 
any other enactment. 
It shall also be a function of the Board 
to report to the Minister .from time to 
time in relation to all or any o.f the 
.function s speci.fied in s ub s ection ( 1) 
of this section. 
In the exercise of its .functions, the 
Board shall have due regard for the need 
to maintain its capital funds and to provide 
for such reserves as it thinks desirable. 
5 1 • 
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Wool Industry Act 1977. 
Section 18 Powers of Boc..rd ~ 
(1) In the exercise of its functions, the Board may 
do all or any of the following things: 
(a) Purchase wool whether produced in 
New Zealand or elsewhere: 
(b) Sell or offer for sale wool and 
manufactured wool, both within and 
outside New Zealand: 
(c) Negotiate and enter into agreements 
and arrangements, whether with person s 
or organisations within or outsid e 
New Zealand, in respect of freight 
rates and other term s and conditions 
for the transport of wool from 
New Zealand. 
(2) Without limiting th r generality of any other 
provisions of this Act or any other enactment, 
the Board shall have all such powers and 
authorities as may be necessary to enable it to -
(a) UndErtake, or cause to be undertaken, 
by way of subsidy or otherwise, 
scientific, industrial, or economic 
research and experimentation in 
relation to wool and sheep, with a 
view to the improvement of the quality 
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of wool, or its increased production, 
or the development of new or improved 
methods of handling or using wool, or 
the development of new or improved 
types of wool, or in connection with 
the general development of the wool 
industry: 
(b) Have processed or manufactured any 
wool produced in New Zealand: 
(c) Buy fibres other than wool, and sell 
or have processed or manufactured such 
fibres in combination or conjunction 
with the sale or processing of New 
Zealand wool: 
(d) Engage or take part in any activity in 
connection with the marketing, use, 
preparation, classifying, standardising , 
sampling, measuring, testing, displaying, 
appraisal, pooling, storage, handling, 
pack~ging, distribution, delivery, 
tran s port, dispo sa l, scouring, 
processing, manufacturing, or exporting 
of wool, and matters related to any of 
those activities: 
Appendix i contd. 
(e) Act in combination or association 
with any person -0r organisation 
within or outside New Zealand, for 
the purpose of furthering the general 
object for which the Board is 
established, on terms of sharing the 
costs and expenses involved in that 
combination or association in such 
proportions or in such manner as may 
be agreed upon: 
(f) Act in combination or association 
with the New Zealand Meat Producers 
Board, the New Zealand Dairy Board, 
or both of them, in carryin~ out or 
assisting any project that may be 
considered hy the Board directly or 
indirectly to benefit the wool industry 
on terms of sharing the costs and 
expenses involved in that combination 
or association in such proportions or 
in such manner as may be agre~d upon: 
(g) Purchase, take on lease or hire, or 
otherwise acquire such land, buildings, 
plant, machinery, and equipment as in 
the opinion of the Board are necessary 
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for the performance of any of its 
functions; and erect, improve, 
alter, extend, equip, furnish, 
repair, and maintain buildings 
on any such land: 
(h) Sell, exchange, transfer, lease, 
. hire, or otherwise dispose or any 
or its real or personal property. 
()) The Board shall have all such other powers and 
authorities as are conferred on it by this Act 
or any enactment other than this Act, or as are 
necessary, conducive, or incidental to the 
attainment or the general object for which 
it is established and to the exercise of its 
functions and powers under this Act or under 
any other enactment. 
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Rules of Wool Research Organisation of New Zealand 
(Incorporated) 
New Rules adopted 27th March, 1968 and including Amendment s 
registered 10 November 1977. 
Rule 3 Objects 
The objects of the Organisation are: 
(a) To promote and conduct research and other scientific 
work in connection with-
(i) the physical, chemical and biological 
properties of wool; 
(ii) the handling, stora~e, transport, 
marketing, scouring, processing, 
utilisation of wool in manufature s , 
and any other matters connected with 
or relating to wool; 
and for these purposes to establi s h, form, equip and 
maintain laboratories and other establishments. 
(b) To make grants for r e search and other scientific 
work in connection with th P breeding, feeding 
and management of sheep in so far as these affect 
primarily the quantity and grade of wool produced 
or in connection with the processing and utilisation 
of wool. 
(c) To collaborate with other institutions or persons 
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in research and other scientific work on the 
effects of fibre and fleece characteristics 
on the processing and utilisation of wool. 
(d) To provide funds for such research and other 
scientific work as aforesaid, whether in 
laboratories established by the Organisation 
or elsewhere and whether on the part of the 
Organisation or of any person. 
(e) To encourage the study and understanding of 
wool science and matters relating directl y 
or indirectly thereto by such mean s as may 
seem proper to the Executive, and in 
particular by grw1ting funds, by awardin g 
fellowships, scholarships and bursaries, 
by conducting discus s ions, semina r s o r 
conferences and by any other appropriate 
method4 
(f) To publish in any form and to otherwise 
disseminate by any means the results of 
research an d other scientific work relating 
to or arisin~ from the activities of the 
Or~anisation or of any other institution, 
group or p e rson. 
(g) To collaborate with any institution, group 
or person engaged in substantially the 
• 
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like purposes as those hereinbefore set out, 
whether in New Zealand or elsewhere. 
(h) Generally to do such things consistent with 
the fore-going objects as may conveniently 
or advantageously be carried on in connection 
herewith . 
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Rules of Wool Research Organisation of New Zealand 
(Incorporated) 
New Rules adopted 27th March, 1968 and including Amendments 
registered 10 November 1977. 
Rule 9 Powers of the Executive 
(a) In addition to the powers expressly conferred 
upon the Executive by these Rules, the Executive 
may exercise the following powers: 
(i) Power to acquire by purchase donation or 
otherwise any description of property 
real or personal including patents brevets 
d'invention and the like. 
(ii) Power to sell lease or otherwise turn to 
account and whether for valuable consideration 
or ~ratuitously any real or personal property 
and to gr~nt any estate ri~ht licence or 
interest therein or in respect thereof. 
(iii)Power to grant subsidies subventions and 
payments whether for valuable consideration 
or gratuitously to any person for any of the 
purposes of the Or~anisation and in particular 
59. 
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to grant funds for research at any 
university or other institution. 
(iv) Power to borrow or raise money for any 
of the objects of the Organisation and 
to contract for repayment of money so 
borrowed and to give security over any 
of the property of the Organisation for 
such repayment. 
(v) Power to accept and hold property real 
and persona l upon trust for any purpose 
general or special within the scope of 
the purposes hereinbefore set out. 
(vi) Power to employ professional staff and 
other servants and agents on such term s 
as it thinks fit. 
(vii)Power to use the funds of the Organisation 
as the Executive may consider necessary or 
proper in payment of the costs and expense s 
in furthering or carrying out the objects 
of the Organisation or any of them includin~ 
the payment of officers servants and agents 
as shall appear necessary or expedient. 
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(viii) Power to establish and maintain and to 
contract for the establishment and 
maintenance of and otherwise to assist 
funds and schemes to provide pensions 
life insurance and other benefits for 
servants and former servants of the 
Organisation. 
(ix) Power to enter into any contracts in 
furtherance of the objects of the 
Organisation. 
(x) Power to provide or assist in the 
provision of dwellings and motor 
vehicles for the use of staff of the 
Organisation whether by way of purchase, 
lease, loan, or otherwise howsoever. 
(xi) 
(xii) 
Power to guarantee the performance of 
the obligations or contracts of any 
person or corporation. 
Power to lend and advance moneys to any 
employee of the Organisation for such 
purposes and on such terms and with or 
without security as the Executive may 
think fit. 
61. 
Appendix 
. . . 
I I I contd. 
(xiii) Power to institute conduct defend compound 
or abandon any legal proceedings by or 
against the Organisation or its officers, 
or otherwise concerning the affairs of 
(xiv) 
the Organisation and also to compound 
and allow time for payment or satisfaction 
of any debts due and of any claims or 
demands by or against the Organisation. 
Power to do such other lawful things as 
may be necessary convenient or incidental 
to the carrying out of the purposes of the 
Organisation 
(b) No person contracting with or taking any assurance 
from the Organisation by virtue of any instrument 
under the Common Seal shall be concerned to see 
whether the contract or assurance is within the 
powers of the Executive under these Rules or be 
affected by any notice or information of non-
compliance with these Rules. 
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